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Forget Culture, Remember Memory?
Eric Gable, University of Mary Washington
Richard Handler, University of Virginia

In this paper1 we want to ask what anthropology can contribute to that
increasingly ubiquitous topic, the study of social memory. To do this
we will first sketch why we think memory has become such a trendy
term. Next we will outline what we see as some similarities and differences in the anthropological concept of culture and the concept
of memory as it is routinely deployed in the social sciences and in
cultural studies broadly conceived. To anticipate our conclusions, we
will argue that for anthropology to contribute to the study of social
memory, anthropologists must be as relentlessly critical of the idea of
memory as anthropologists have been critical of culture, their own favorite term. Indeed, as we hope to show, “culture” and “memory” are
parallel concepts, sometimes useful, sometimes not. Sometimes the
terms reveal and illuminate, sometimes the terms obscure and get in
the way of our capacity to understand and interpret what people are
doing and thinking in this place in this moment in time.
Both culture and memory obscure or get in the way when they
become inappropriately anthropomorphized. Cultures do not think
or feel. Societies do not remember. And the individual, as conceptualized in modern ideology, is not necessarily the socially defined
agent that “bears”—that is, possesses—memory or culture as if they
were things. Worst of all, both “culture” and “memory” get in the
way of our ability to interpret when these terms allow us to import
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into one society a world view that is native to another, mistaking the
local for the universal. Memory and culture are native concepts after
all. As such they are especially relevant when we wish to understand
the native point of view of contemporary cultural-studies discourses—discourses that currently have a global reach. But for the study
of native points of view that do not participate in those discourses,
these terms can, as often as not, be a dangerous distraction.
TRENDY MEMORY
So, why is memory such a hot topic today? Clearly part of the answer involves our current, we might say personal, preoccupation
with forgetting. This preoccupation is a constant topic in the news
and popular press. Figuring out how to stop or stave off forgetting
is becoming a huge business. Hundreds of researchers in psychology departments all over the U.S. and Europe are busy trying to discover the chemistry of how we remember and forget. Forgetting is
associated with Alzheimer’s syndrome and aging: everything from
“where did I put my keys” to “who am I—or you?” In the vernacular,
I am my memories. If I forget too much, I lose myself. So, in societies
like ours, with its demographic bulges and troughs, the media bombards us with stories and images of the pathos of forgetting, not to
mention a plethora of remedies—Sudoku, crossword puzzles, a daily
dose of exercise or gingko biloba. The ubiquity of our preoccupation
with forgetting in a society such as ours limns and adds luster to the
scholarly fascination with the topic.
But let us not forget that memory in the scholarly literature outside of psychology is a shorthand for a social rather than a personal
phenomenon. Memory in this literature is social memory. It is associated with everything from monuments to the crude propaganda
totalitarian regimes make; from public to popular imaginings, aided
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by the media, for example, of the holocaust or Vietnam. Memory in
this sense is rarely personal, even as individual people may literally
remember—as if it happened to them—what they saw on TV or read
in a book, or heard from a friend or family member. “Memory” in
this sense in the scholarly literature is a shorthand term for a host of
images, words, and ideas collectivities share and communicate which
are all more or less associated with the past. For making “memory”
such a trendy umbrella term to refer to a grab bag of social practices
associated with imagining the past we can thank—or blame—cultural historians.2
Just as we are personally anxious about forgetting, so too does
it seem that the scholarly fascination with memory among cultural
historians and other scholars in the social sciences and in cultural
studies broadly conceived is driven by a certain anxiety—an anxiety
such scholars associate generically with modernity, but also more
specifically with those great modern transformations we call revolutions or revolutionary upheavals, from the French and American
Revolutions and the Industrial Revolution to the rise and fall of the
totalitarian regimes in Germany and Russia. Such transformations
are said to have led to pronounced shifts in the historical imaginations of the affected peoples, and perhaps to the end of history itself.
No wonder, then, that modernity has long been associated with
loss. Modernity is primarily a story of progress, but progress always
entails loss. To go forward you must forget, yet you regret what you
no longer recall so you collect souvenirs, mementos. Modernity is
always nostalgic. Nostalgia, for the most part, remains a shadow of
the idea of progress. But in times of crisis, so the scholarly wisdom
goes, nostalgia becomes a sort of refuge. Thus nostalgia is a common theme in the discourses of the new emerging nationalisms of
the post-modern era. And this is not surprising given that a common
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assumption of nationalists is that nations, like individuals, require a
past to have an identity.
The politics of nostalgia in new nations, or in newly transformed
old nations, makes memory an obvious topic for cultural historians,
but it hardly explains why they have chosen the term “memory” to
encapsulate this complex set of discursive practices. We might also
look at recent disciplinary shifts to get a handle on why so many
historians like the term “memory.” Here it is important to stress a
venerable distinction historians make between history and memory. Historically at least (forgive the pun) historians have tended to
dismiss memory as inferior to the material traces of the past, especially to documents—to text. From the perspective of historiography, memory used to be by and large what savages or illiterate peasants have. It was what idiot savants excel in or what racial inferiors
rely on and do so well. Horses or dogs or monkeys might have more
of it than “we”; that is, literate or educated or cultured people, did.
Don’t forget, Thomas Jefferson’s systematic assault on the mentality
of people of African descent entailed that he granted them a superior
memory because their minds were inferior. Indeed, for Jefferson, it
was the extraordinary memories of blacks that made them dangerous. Better, he argued, to ship them back to Africa than to free them
here in America, where they would endlessly recall and seek bloody
retribution for the scars of their enslavement. Because they remembered too well they could never be citizens of the same nation as
their erstwhile masters who, while they defiled themselves in the
institution of slavery, were at least more intelligent, more balanced
in their capacity for reason and thus would get over the corrupting
influences of their collective past (Jefferson 2002).
Thus in Jefferson’s day memory was inferior mental capacity—a
reflex as it were. As with Jefferson, so too with historians. Animals
remember and human inferiors remember; historians and moderns
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in general do not because they neither need to nor want to. They can
rely on the superiority of the text and the document to do their remembering for them, and in any case, memory fades and warps with
the passage of time. The document, by contrast, if properly stored
and protected, lasts forever and speaks forever of that past moment
in which it was produced.
Historians read such a record. And “memory” is a term that allows them to put distance between the work they do—making objective histories in the form of scholarly treatises or popular books,
making histories in the form of museum exhibits, documentaries, or
lectures—and what the common folk, but also increasingly the state,
that sinister abstraction, also does. Once “memory” is a term distinct
from history, cultural historians can also allow themselves to write
histories about the work of memory either as a popular impulse or a
state project. Note that historians tend to fall into two camps when
they write their histories of memory. Either they expose memory’s
elisions and erasures or they celebrate its capacity to expose, reveal,
critique. In the first instance memory is routinely conflated with the
official activities of the state or the state’s other analogs—the corporation, the ruling class, the powers that be. The common trope is
that of substitution. The state manufactures memory for the people
who, as a result of their exposure to the state’s narrative, forget what
they themselves experienced or heard from their elders or their compatriots. In this scheme the state makes uniform memories in order
to order. They build monuments, host celebrations (the anniversary
of this or that battle, or war, the beginning of a nation, the birthday
of a president), edit and teach school books, and produce films all
to make a past that serves their purposes into a memory that each
citizen or subject has. In the second instance, memory is imagined
as a popular and persistent eruption. Memory, despite all those
monuments and publicly endorsed stories, or better yet, because of
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their sheer bombastic monumentality, their kitschiness, cannot be
squelched. Popular memory rises up, like a fart or like bones from a
shallow grave, to contest official accounts.
Like bones from a shallow grave because the idea of popular
memory reeks of a certain kind of past. The past of totalitarian regimes, of state-initiated violence, of gas chambers, mass executions,
death squads, of the disappeared—of a politics, in short, of repression and of resistance, to repression, however feeble.
Like a fart because memory in this view is often a kind of low subversion—a weapon of the weak, to borrow James Scott’s apt phrase
(Scott 1985). Thus, for example, in East German cities before the wall
came down buildings cratered or scarred by shrapnel were often
marked with a plaque commemorating “Evidence of Allied Bombing,” while in a theatre playing a film celebrating the Red Army’s
conquest of Berlin, when a tank was shown destroying a building
with a single well placed shot, someone in the audience could use
the darkness to remark out loud, “Evidence of Allied Bombing,” and
others could laugh at the quick joke at the state’s expense.
So, for cultural historians the work of memory is obviously
political, engaged. It is therefore important to be on the right side of
the struggle, usually the subaltern side. This does not mean, however, that historians restrict themselves to romancing memory as
a kind of revolutionary return of the repressed. The best of them
are well aware that memories, even the popular kind, are not to be
taken at face value. Indeed, like those anthropologists such as
Michael Taussig who celebrate the surreal and fantastical in popular imaginings, so too do cultural historians know that subaltern
memories might be equally fictional, like magical realism, while
remaining allegorically true.
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THE EVASION OF CULTURE
Now that we have suggested why memory is so trendy, linking
memory as an idea to recent disciplinary shifts in cultural history,
we would like to ask: what is the relationship between culture and
memory, as anthropological concepts? To approach an answer to
that question, consider another: what is the place of anthropology
among the social and cultural sciences?
One answer to the second question, surely not wrong, is that
anthropology in theory studies global human diversity, which has
meant that in practice anthropology has focused on all those peoples
that the other social sciences ignored, especially those peoples once
called primitive and now called, perhaps, “peripheral” or “marginalized” or merely “non-Western”—there is no good term. Indeed, the
fact that all such terms designate those societies we imagine most
unlike us points to an important truth about the social sciences.
With the exception of anthropology, they all conflate humankind
with one, and only one, of its varieties, the modern Western world.
As Louis Dumont (1977; 1986) has argued, from the seventeenth
century onward, the gradual formation of the social sciences—political science, economics, sociology, psychology—corresponded to,
and indeed mapped, modernity’s emerging understanding of the social world as partitioned among a number of discrete domains (the
state, the economy, society, psyche, and so on). The discipline of history is founded on a similar move, for, as Daniel Segal (2000) has
shown, the modern concept of history presupposes a notion of “prehistory”—the time before writing—that excludes much of humanity
from consideration by historians. By definition, history is, as Segal
(2000, 772) ironically remarks, “post-prehistory.”
To the analytically fragmented vision that the social and cultural
sciences both map and project, anthropology opposes its own holistic
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understanding of humankind. Yet, anthropologists have two quite
distinct ways to conceptualize holism. The more common of the two,
as represented in the American four-field approach, has been formulated from within the modern worldview and, more important, is
content to reproduce its analytic categories. In this view, which Clifford Geertz (1973) once called stratigraphic, anthropology entails a
pragmatic bundling of separate disciplines that, taken together, can
analyze humankind in all its dimensions and, adding up the results,
as it were, arrive at a holistic vision of humanity. These disciplines
are, of course, “the sacred bundle” of biological anthropology, archaeology, linguistic anthropology, and sociocultural anthropology.
If we add to these such latter-day sub-disciplines as political, economic, ecological, psychological (and so on) anthropologies, we can
find within anthropology all the other social sciences and, indeed,
several humanities and science disciplines as well.
But according to Geertz, Dumont, and others, there is a very different kind of anthropological holism, one that is not stratigraphic,
one that insists on cultures or societies as potentially incommensurable wholes. We stress the word “potential” here because you do not
have to imagine such wholes as hermetically sealed in order to grasp,
nonetheless, the idea that there are no one-to-one correspondences
between the categories of one such cultural world and those of another. From the perspective of this kind of holism, there is no reason
to believe that the modern categories enshrined in our university
curriculum are the right ones to use if one’s concern is to understand
other, non-Western, social worlds. “Economics,” “politics,” “art,” and
“religion” are not to be found everywhere.
Indeed, from the perspective of this second kind of anthropological holism, we must call into question, or suspend our use of, not
only our disciplinary categories, but some basic cross-disciplinary
concepts that all the social and cultural sciences presume. These
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include the distinction between individual and group (whether we
refer to the group dimension as society, polity, or culture) and the
habit of conceptualizing entities at both the individual and group
level as internally homogeneous, neatly bounded, and possessed of
agency. A final set of presupposition we should suspend concerns
the question of social order. Although various theoretical strands in
Western thought privilege “change,” “conflict,” or “miscommunication,” the social and cultural sciences in general start from the notion that social order is the fundamental fact, and, further, that order
is to be understood as sharing, whether the stuff that is shared is
imagined as physical substance (blood), cultural symbols (including
memories), or economic and political interests.
While “culture” has been the dominant concept of American
anthropology since Boas, the term has repeatedly come into conflict with, and been temporarily rejected in favor of, concepts like
“economic base,” “social structure,” and more recently “identity,”
“practice,” and finally, yes, “memory.” We want to argue that in all of
these theoretical disputes of the last 70 years or so, the implicit battle
has been between the two kinds of anthropological holism. From
the analytical perspective of the first kind of holism, which tries to
sum the causal force of various “layers” of social reality (the economic,
psychological, social, and so on), the individual-group dichotomy
remains a governing presupposition. That is to say, “the individual”
remains a privileged analytic unit, and the problem comes to be seen
as how to weigh the causal significance of the “forces” that act upon
the individual as they emanate from the various social domains. In
the end, this approach always reduces the social to the sum of individually experienced actions and decisions. Even the forces of culture and society are conceptualized, by social scientists, in terms of
how they affect individuals, and, through individuals, the groups to
which they belong.
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From the perspective of the second variety of anthropological
holism, however, there is no reason to suppose that the “individual
versus group” dichotomy is universally relevant. Certainly we should
not imagine these terms as universally and equally salient in all cultures. As Dumont (1977, 8) puts it, individual persons are empirically
present in all societies, but the individual, as a morally autonomous
agent imagined in contradistinction to society (itself imaged as a
collection of individuals and a collective individual with its own
agency) is a peculiarly modern phenomenon.
When we forget that the individual-versus-society approach
is grounded in our own native understandings, and when we turn
those understandings and concepts into analytic categories, we find
ourselves confronted with an unsolvable problem: which is more important, for explanatory purposes, the society or the individual? The
dilemma is impossible because, as anthropologists, we know that individuals are shaped by their social surroundings, and that, in some
sense, they cannot exist apart from it. Similarly, we know that societies or cultures are “composed of” individuals, and that all social actions and forces must in some way emanate from individual human
beings. As Ruth Benedict once rather plaintively asked, “where else
could any [culture] trait come from except from the behavior of a
man or a woman or a child?” (1934, 253).
Despite the fact that the individual-society dichotomy presents
an impossible dilemma, fashions in the social and cultural sciences
tend to swing back and forth between both its poles. When, for example, structuralism of one sort or another becomes too obviously unreal—when, that is, it becomes increasingly unconvincing to
lodge explanatory power in impossibly remote patterns or structures
available only at the end of an exquisite and difficult analysis—then
theoretical fashion begins to swing back the other way. Not pattern
but the individual, not structure but action or practice, not culture

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/southernanthro_proceedings/vol39/iss1/3

10

Gable and Handler: Forget Culture, Remember Memory? (Keynote Address)
F O R G E T C U LT U R E , R E M E M B E R M E M O RY ?

33

but identity, not ideas but material realities and the on-the-ground
actions of real human beings, and so on.
And, of course, not history but memory. We remarked earlier
that we have cultural historians to thank or to blame for making
memory such a hot topic. As anthropologists, we should thank them
because they opened up a field of study—of monuments, of museums, of ceremonies and mythologies—in short, of rituals and representations that have always been the bread and butter of anthropology. No wonder that we have increasingly taken to this terrain as we,
as a discipline, have shifted our field from out-of-the-way places and
the savage slot back home, as it were, to the nation and the state.
But we can also blame them for making “memory” a term of art
because this term—which, after all, is psychological and individualistic, and which at best is a metaphor drawn from the level of the
individual to talk about social and cultural phenomena—leads to the
reproduction of the individual-society dichotomy. As such, it confines the social and cultural sciences within the well-worn grooves of
modern Western individualism. And it replaces the mysteries of cultural, symbolic phenomenon—those processes whereby human individuals are never merely individuals as Westerners imagine them
to be, just as societies or cultures are not collective objects—with
that fatiguing analytic process of tacking between the psychological
and the social.
MEMORY AND THOUGHT
If “memory” belongs to a set of terms that are made to represent the
individual pole of the individual-society dichotomy, it nonetheless
differs from such terms as “practice,” “action,” and even “the individual.” “Memory” refers not to material or on-the-ground realities,
as those other terms do, but to mental phenomena. We attribute
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mental phenomena easily enough to the individual, and thus memory
anthropomorphizes, as we said at the outset. Yet, of course, the mystery of culture is located (conceptually, as it were) at the point where
brain becomes mind; that is, where individuals become individuals
(and culturally defined ones, at that) only through cultural processes
that are in the end not individualistic. Is it useful, we now ask, to
think about memory as a particular kind of thought, and if so, how
does memory differ from culture itself?
To begin, let us note that “memory” is a peculiar, if predictable,
term to use when one is writing about what people collectively or as
individuals imagine they know about the past. It is peculiar even if
one begins by stressing that in a strict sense every thought a person
has is a memory. Thoughts are after the fact and are never the facts
themselves, but representations, constructs. Yet, in the strict sense
every memory is also a thought. “Memory,” “thought,” and “imagination” are words we routinely deploy to speak about the same mental process.
For historians, “memory” is the term of choice because it privileges mental activity as an historical endeavor. Homo historicus
remembers, has a memory. In anthropology thought has often been
reified in a parallel fashion. People think, of course, just as they
remember, but we tend also to say that societies have a memory or
that they have a “culture,” which, scratch the surface of that term,
assumes that they have thought. Culture, in the platonic sense, is
Thought (the capitalization is always implied), thought embodied,
to be sure, in objects, words, rituals, and so forth—all those models
of and for that Geertz made famous—but nevertheless thought: personality-writ-large, mentalité, and all that. Cultures are like people
in that they have systems of thought. So, given the obvious dangers,
what benefit is there to calling memory “thought,” or thought “memory”? In both we have inappropriate anthropomorphization. People
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think or remember, but societies do not have memory or thought.
Clearly they do not remember or think.
In a semantic sense, thought privileges the present, memory
the past. But memory also privileges, inadvertently, a directly experienced, if warped or transformed, past. Yet most of the past, as
a congeries of representations that interest cultural historians and
anthropologists, is not this kind of past at all. Rather it is nothing
more or less than an indigenous practice of communicating about
what is in the past. It is a practice that usually blurs the boundary in
time between moments experienced by the living and the dead. It is
a practice that routinely blurs the boundary between what is experienced and heard or read. For the two of us—and we would suggest
that we share this view with many in anthropology—this indigenous
practice of communicating about the past can be called “history,”
and “history” can be roughly defined as a story of the past made out
of words, images, and objects, often in combination. History in this
sense is what historians make. But it is also what anthropologists
have sometimes called “myth” when it is a story some savage tells
us about distant events that savage claims happened at or near the
beginning of time. When scholars such as cultural historians write
about collective memory, or social memory, or vernacular memory
or official memory, or sites of memory, and then generally in a sentence or two deploy, as a shorthand for these, the word “memory,”
we would substitute for that word “memory” the word “history.” We
do this for two reasons. One, history avoids the easy and inevitable
anthropomorphizations. History is not as immediately or obviously
a personal experience. It is an account, a narrative that you tell about
something you objectify as a past. Second, history purposively blurs
and confounds the distinction cultural historians see, and want to
maintain, between history as a written product, more or less objective, and memory as a popular conception, often oral, occasionally

Published by eGrove, 2022

13

Proceedings of the annual meeting of the Southern Anthropological Society, Vol. 39 [2022], No. 1, Art. 3
36

ER IC GA BLE A ND R ICHA R D HA NDLER

accurate, usually distorted, that is shaped by passion and prejudice,
that reflects the desires and fears of the teller, that has to be scrutinized and evaluated in the light of other evidence.
Any anthropologist knows that what people claim to remember
is, to put it crudely, a cultural fiction. But by the same token so are
the histories historians write. Note that even those historians most
engaged in the study of social memory are often not willing to challenge the hegemony of history over memory. They may well know
something we anthropologists might insist upon: that as conveyers
of cultural information, documents are no more “reliable” or “objective” than any other kind of cultural object. Beyond that, documents
can be downright duplicitous. Documents can be erased or forged;
and thus they can infect memory, replacing partial truths with absolute lies. Historians may well know this, but they ignore it as they go
about their business.
It begins to seem, then, that the distinction between “memory”
and “history” speaks rather to our own notions of the individual
in relationship to society, and “amateur” (or individual) knowledge
versus institutionally (or socially) produced expertise, than to a useful epistemological distinction between types of thought. Indeed, we
would go further and say that the use of the term “memory” in the
social and cultural sciences is yet another example of the canonization of our own “domaining” of knowledge and our expectation that
terms drawn from those domains can serve universally, in any and
all cultural settings.
What, then, of the relationship between the terms “memory” and
“culture”? From the first approach to culture that we outlined above,
the stratigraphic approach, “memory” is another term that allows us
to compare the causal significance of individual forces in relation to
those that are social. But from the second approach to culture, which
seeks for a holism that does not rely on the Western stratigraphic
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model of what society is, there does not seem to be much utility in
distinguishing the terms “memory” and “culture” for purposes of a
cultural analysis of human thought. After all, what in culture does
not implicate some sort of symbolic reference to what has gone before the present moment (the only moment in which thought can
“occur”)? And what in memory is not “always already” culturally
structured? To put this another way, given an adequate theory of culture as symbolic process, and accepting the term “memory” as one
that Western natives use to talk about themselves, is there any reason
to use memory as an analytic construct at all?
THE PAST FROM THE NATIVE’S POINT OF VIEW
The answer, to anticipate our conclusion, is only when such a term
is an indigenous one. When they talk about memory, then we must
listen to them. But when we analyze what they say about “memory,”
we inevitably embed that term in a larger cultural context. When natives in our society, at least, are talking about the past as a representation, “memory” is always a term that shadows “history,” or more
prosaically “the past.” To show you what we mean, it might help to
leave the terrain of abstraction to look at things on the ground. After
all, anthropology really only comes into its own when it is conveyed
as ethnography.
So let us briefly revisit our experience of studying at Colonial Williamsburg and Monticello—places cultural historians would clearly
recognize as a “sites of memory,” but places we prefer to call “museums,” “public history” sites, even “shrines,” because these terms
hew more closely to the words our native interlocutors use when
they describe these places to us. When we did research we constantly
found ourselves asking: “How is the past imagined and discussed at
these sites—from ‘the native’s point of view’?” And we did so because

Published by eGrove, 2022

15

Proceedings of the annual meeting of the Southern Anthropological Society, Vol. 39 [2022], No. 1, Art. 3
38

ER IC GA BLE A ND R ICHA R D HA NDLER

our natives too were preoccupied with that question. Let’s start with
Williamsburg, and to simplify we will look at the question from the
perspectives of two kinds of natives—first, those who managed it
and used it to communicate to the public about the past; second,
those whose job it was to ensure that visitors kept returning to the
site as satisfied consumers of what the place had to offer.
Among those who worked at Williamsburg as educators (and
that includes frontline guides or “historic interpreters,” their managers and higher-level administrators (including historians), we rarely
heard the word “memory” used except as a pejorative term, something the visiting public brought with them that got in the way of
learning about the real past. Visitors, it was said, sometimes misremembered the place—talking about tours that never happened or
recalling objects sold in gift shops that never existed. Or more often
they remembered the way the place used to look and wanted it to
stay that way. But scholarship—that is, historical knowledge—was
always advancing, so the landscape, the architecture, the decor and
even what was told about these had to change. Confronted with these
changes—paint left to peel or go dingy on the exteriors of buildings;
for example, or paint applied in gaudy and clashing colors to erstwhile austere interiors—made visitors angry and above all mistrustful. They assumed the worst about Williamsburg—that it was trying
to do things on the cheap, or that it had substituted plebian tastes for
patrician ones.
Memory in this sense got in the way of the work of communicating about the past. The presence of memories in the minds of visitors
required that visitors not only had to be taught about the past itself
but endlessly reminded of Williamsburg’s good intentions. Indeed
perhaps the salient feature of a place like Williamsburg was how
much pedagogical work involved what we came to see as impression
management. Managing the impression visitors had about the site
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entailed stressing the disinterested work of historiography. New facts
would be found and historians followed those facts where they led.
Inaccuracies, especially anachronisms, were in turn blamed on the
visitors themselves. Trees on the Duke of Glougchester Street? Well,
these remained because the public assumed that old tall oaks and
the past were one and the same, and besides they liked the shade.
Gardens full of boxwoods, or doorways decorated with wreaths?
Well, these remained because that’s what visitors also wanted and
expected, and remembered.
If educators at Colonial Williamsburg often blamed visitors for
clinging to an inappropriate memory of the past or for remembering
what clearly never occurred, those who were charged with selling the
site to the public used “memory” in a very different, even contradictory way. In advertisements and brochures visitors were encouraged to
come to Colonial Williamsburg to make memories or have memorable experiences. Such talk of memory is hardly surprising. It has long
been recognized that in modern consumerist societies, as Antze and
Lambek stress in their excellent summary of memory studies (1996),
“memory” is conflated with “experience” and both are imagined as
things to be possessed. In the case of Williamsburg, like so many
similar sites, what was sold as memorable conflated both the pedagogically useful and the personally gratifying. Parents, so the modal
trope had it, could take children to Colonial Williamsburg and their
brush with the past would make them better at school, more capable
of retaining the arcana of their school-based history lessons because
they had had a memorable experience chatting with an historical
interpreter in a costume while eating colonial-era food in a tavern or
seeing sheep grazing in a field while the smell of wood smoke filled
the air. But this pleasurable, pedagogical memory enhancement was
also advertised as producing memory in a more personal way: being
with family and having fun as a family were equated with producing
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the kinds of memorable experiences that would become the mortar
of family bonds. As a rule Williamsburg did not disappoint in producing such memorable experiences. Indeed, that is why so many
visitors returned, say, as adults with children of their own, eager to
show them the militia marching down the street, eager to have them
taste Brunswick stew or eat a smoked turkey leg held in their fist, so
as to revisit the magic of their childhood memories.
Needless to say, we found it fascinating that the production of
such memorable experiences was as often as not at odds with the
larger pedagogical objectives of the site. They created the very visitor who would complain if things changed—if the current Williamsburg was not like the Williamsburg they remembered and cherished.
The paradox was that personal memories were at once manufactured
by the site and trivialized. Thus it is that the consumer slouches into
the sites of public history in modern societies.
At Monticello, in contrast to Colonial Williamsburg, memory
has in recent years been politicized because of its conflation with
race and racial difference. We probably do not have to remind any
of you of the convoluted controversy of Thomas Jefferson’s alleged
affair with Sally Hemings, a slave. But it is worth recalling that before the DNA evidence was accepted with alacrity by the Thomas
Jefferson Foundation as likely proof that Jefferson and Hemings
had produced offspring, the controversy pitted what both sides in
the controversy called African American “memories,” passed on via
“oral tradition,” against what the Foundation saw as the judicious
weighing of evidence by historians whose written products could be
taken as an antidote to rumor and myth.
African Americans have a word for this kind of history. They call
it “his story” because it is the story “the Man,” the master, the powers
that be; write or tell about the past in order to cover up or hide or otherwise lie in self-serving ways about what really happened. And they
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like to recount personal experiences of encounters with “his story”
at the moment of its manufacture, thereby stressing its contrivance.
Thus it was that many African Americans could speak from what
they considered to be their personal memory of visiting Monticello
and seeing the infamous stairway that led from Jefferson’s alcove bed
to a secret chamber where Hemings waited quietly for safety of the
night. Barbara Chase-Riboud, author of a novel (i.e., fiction) that so
irked Monticello’s staff because it made so many visitors skeptical
about the Foundation’s claims to honesty (Chase-Riboud 1979), asserted in an interview in 1994 that the stairway was removed shortly
after the bestselling novel came under ruthless attack by various historians. “They ripped it out on July 4th 1979, leaving a gaping hole…
What kind of rage must they have experienced to do that?” To this
charge, Monticello’s director Daniel Jordon conceded in the obligatory reportorial counterpoint that the stairway was indeed removed,
but that it led only to a storage closet, not a hiding place, while also
insisting that the stairway “was probably installed in the Victorian
era.”
Needless to say, Jordan’s response might sound to skeptics a lot
like “his story” all over again. But what fascinated us just as much
was his deployment of the judicious “probably” because it typifies
what we came to see as an uncomfortable fact about public history
at places like Monticello and Williamsburg: the troubling absence
of text when text is most needed. Monticello and Williamsburg are
sometimes referred to as if they were texts. Clearly they are complexly produced and reproduced congeries of objects whose very objectivity makes them hard to ignore, hard not to experience as facts. But
despite their objectivity, they are as factual as a memory or, for that
matter, the books historians write. Over time, decisions are made
about what to hang on this wall or plant in that garden bed, what to
pull out or to rearrange. At every step in this process, documents are
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consulted, but so too are guesses made, inferences. These inferences
sometimes are documented—a memo in an archive—and sometimes
they are not. Thus it is that at Monticello, for example, if you visit the
house today you encounter a map of Africa hanging prominently
in the entry hall along with Indian artifacts and mastodon bones,
not to mention the Great Clock and the concave mirror. This room
was in Jefferson’s day a museum of sorts—a cabinet of curiosities.
The map of Africa, though, never hung in that room. Why it hangs
there today is a mystery we have tried to solve. At present our best
guess is that it reflects a curatorial decision, one of several, to make
Africa, or rather African Americans, a more prominent part of the
kind of community of memory Monticello has been endeavoring to
create since the mid-nineties. But we can only guess because, while
the moment of its hanging is recorded, the origins of that decision
have been forgotten and leave no trace in any archive. Thus it is that
“his story” becomes history, or at least a fact you may or may not
notice when you tour Monticello today.
CONCLUSION: FORGET MEMORY?
We began by asking why “memory” is so trendy and why, because
it is so trendy, anthropologists might do well to keep their distance
from this term. At the same time, we have suggested that we pay attention to what natives say and do.
If native conceptions of what we call the past are not structured
in terms of Western theories of history and memory, then it does little good to analyze those conceptions in terms of ours. Trying to apply an oxymoron like “social memory” to worlds that do not already
presuppose the Western dichotomy of the individual versus society
makes it too easy to rewrite their psychology, and their epistemology,
in terms of ours.
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In the study of Western societies, however, where forgetting has
become a paradigm of loss in the face of progress, anthropologists
will have to pay attention to the native discourse of memory. The
trick here is to remember to include social scientists and historians
among the natives. Thus we found, at the history sites we have explored, a studied endeavor to forget or overlook the similar processes
that occur in the production of history and the production of personal memories. Not to be conspiratorial, but there is clearly a purpose, if inadvertent, in such forgetting. At both Monticello and Williamsburg, the purveyors of public history can continue to imagine
that what they do is based on written texts, on real facts, on disinterest rather than passion or prejudice. Others, inferiors—people they
must patronize—have memories. They, by contrast, possess history.
Yet from the analytic perspective we have outlined here, history and
memory are one and the same. They are discourses about the past
constructed from the perspective of the present. They are “cultural”
in the anthropological sense of the term, and they are patterned in
the way culture is patterned, holistically.
NOTES
1. Presented as the keynote address to the Southern Anthropological Society, Saturday, March 15, 2008, University of Mary Washington, Staunton, Virginia.
2. There is an enormous literature on social memory, which we do
not review in this paper. Especially useful to us has been the volume
edited by Paul Antze and Michael Lambek (1996) as well as several
reflective essays by historians (Confino 1997, Crane 1997, and Kansteiner 2002).
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